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Liberty, Patriarchy, and Feminism
Richard A Epsteint
Relationships between the sexes - a topic that now passes
under the rubric of gender studies - engage each of us all the
time. The terms of these interactions are direct, personal, and
largely inescapable. For everyone, the issues of perspective and
bias necessarily surge to the fore, because everyone necessarily
receives direct information about these relationships from only
one side of the great divide. What a man learns about women
does not come from his direct experience as a woman. What a
woman learns about men (and here the point seems forgotten
sometimes) likewise does not stem from her direct experience as a
man. Neither side occupies any privileged position. All of us, men
and women, can learn from observation and conversation, some
better than others. But that knowledge is always mediated by a
barrier that no amount of socialization can overcome.
Our constant interaction with other people of both sexes in-
vites and compels us to hold powerful opinions on how these rela-
tionships should be structured, both in our own lives and in the
larger world. This immediacy of our perceptions exerts a powerful
influence over how the subject of relationships is both perceived
and taught. Few of us, for example, have had the misfortune to be
involved in tort litigation, so we do not bring to the study of tort
theory deep personal convictions on the roles of negligence, con-
tributory negligence, and proximate causation. But our nonstop
experience on matters pertaining to relations between the sexes
makes it harder to maintain that same level of intellectual de-
tachment. The constant stream of new information must in its
own way contribute to the gulf in perceptions that separates
(some) men from (some) women.
t James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago
Law School. My thanks to Andrew Koppelman for riding me so hard on these issues, and
to Laura Clinton and Martha Apalsch for their valuable research assistance.
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I. WHY PATRIARCHY?
The depth of that separation was brought home to me with
great force by the Article of my former student and colleague,
Professor Mary Becker. In the course of her Article, Becker de-
scribes the ubiquitous nature of patriarchy, noting that it sur-
vives in one form or another in virtually any form of social or-
ganization. "Patriarchal social structures have been tribal, mon-
archical, and totalitarian; dictatorial and democratic; nomadic,
feudal, capitalist, and socialist; religious and atheistic; primitive
and post-modern; tolerant and repressive of pornography."1 To
Becker the vast differences between these social systems count
for naught in the larger scheme of things. In dealing with this
material, three components of her remarks require some com-
ment.
First, Becker insists dogmatically that all men and all
women are alike, thus overlooking differences within as well as
between the sexes. Second, Becker problematically relies on non-
falsifiable propositions about the role of sex differences in human
behavior. Third, Becker pessimistically evaluates human nature,
both male and female. Let us take up these points in order.
A. Categorical Sex Classifications
Becker's first major methodological flaw is her failure to ex-
amine the differences, crude or subtle, within either the class of
men or the class of women. In both her oral presentation and Ar-
ticle for this Volume, I do not recall hearing the word "some" used
to modify either men or women. Her propositions were couched in
categorical terms about how all men interact with all women. The
possibility that some natural dispersion of behaviors and atti-
tudes could, or indeed must, surface in any large population did
not slow down her condemnation of what she perceives as the
sorry subordinate status of women in relationship to men.
Nor is she alone. To give but one other well-known example,
Robin West invoked similar declamatory utterances in describing
the differences between men and women. In seeking to define the
differences between men and women in terms of their social rela-
tionships, she wrote: "Women are actually or potentially materi-
ally connected to other human life. Men aren't. This material fact
has existential consequences. While it may be true for men that
Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U
Chi Legal F 21, 26.
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the individual is 'epistemologically and morally prior to the col-
lectivity,' it is not true for women.'
Taken in its narrower compass, the position seems to state
the logical oddity that women are connected to men, but men are
not connected to women. It seems to posit that women invariably
bond among themselves, when it is impossible for men to form
and maintain the simplest social attachments. From this it fol-
lows that autonomy and freedom are male values, embodied in
the traditional rule-of-law belief that all persons stand as free,
equal, and independent human beings with equal dignity before
the law.3 To someone like West or Becker, this preoccupation with
autonomy leads to the rigid separation between individuals,
which is wholly inconsistent with the nurturing and caring ways
that women interact with each other. The result is a kind of legal
and social inferno in which women routinely and silently are
forced to live in a topsy-turvy world "of intimacy, bonding, sepa-
ration, sexual invasion, nurturance and intrusion."4 According to
this reasoning, it goes without saying that the good things are
generated among women themselves and the bad things, both
social and sexual, are imposed on them by men.
This assertion misunderstands the logic of autonomy and
freedom by relegating them to the lowly status of male virtues.
Liberty has no gender. Nothing about the general principle of lib-
erty tells men or women what kinds of relationships they should
enter. If men prefer arm's length deals with rigid contractual
terms that remove all opportunities for good faith defenses, let
them. If women prefer to enter into relationship contracts under
which they share risk and shun courts, let them. If contracts be-
tween men and women fall somewhere between these two ex-
tremes, that's fine as well. If some men migrate to the ostensible
female pattern, that's fine too; and so is the reverse migration by
women. The principle of autonomy carries with it the right to dis-
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U Chi L Rev 1, 14 (1988).
One species is Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 191 (Harvard 1985), quoted
in West, 55 U Chi L Rev at 6 (cited in note 2). Thus Dworkin writes: "What does it mean
for the government to treat its citizens as equals? That is ... the same question as the
question of what it means for the government to treat all its citizens as free, or as independ-
ent, or with equal dignity." Id (emphasis added) (capitalization omitted). His answer, a
howling nonsequitur, is the principle of "rough equality: resources and opportunities
should be distributed, so far as possible, equally, so that roughly the same share of what-
ever is available is devoted to satisfying the ambitions of each." Dworkin, A Matter of
Principle at 192. The sentence is written in the passive voice, so we do not quite know who
does the distribution. And it leaves open the question of how many times we must redis-
tribute when wealth is both increased and skewed through market transactions.
' West, 55 U Chi L Rev at 65 (cited in note 2).
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pose of one's labor and capital as one sees fit. It does not dictate
the types of arrangements that any person can or should enter,
given the power. The classical system of freedom of contract is
flexible enough to accommodate the tastes of all individuals un-
der one umbrella, and more importantly, by allowing them the
right to choose their contracting partners it promotes an efficient
sorting of individuals so that like team up with like.' Indeed, in
contemporary society the power of assortive mating, under which
men and women marry by social class, exerts an enormous influ-
ence on the overall social landscape.' The acts of dominance and
coercion, when brought about by the threat and use of force, form
no part of a system of autonomy and freedom. They constitute the
cardinal vices within the system.
Becker's categorical approach, on either sociability or domi-
nance, does more than misunderstand the logic of freedom and
autonomy. It is intrinsically odd for a priori reasons. The matter
has less to do with distinctive features of feminist thought than
with the law of large numbers. Whatever the mechanism in any
particular case, the brute fact of variation within members of any
given class is the one immutable feature of any large population.
All men are not the same age, the same height, or the same
weight; nor do they have the same temperaments and personali-
ties. The same proposition is indubitably true about women as
well. The persistent refusal to recognize how differences play out
within the sexes may serve a useful rhetorical function of high-
lighting differences between these two distributions. But it also
has the dangerous consequence of ignoring important differences
among men, and differences among women, which, once obscured,
will surely lead us to draw extreme and indefensible conclusions.
Here is but one example. If all men were "the same," then it
would hardly pay for any woman to be selective about the choice
of mates: why incur search costs if all roads lead to the same
marital oblivion? But if differences in temperament, style, and
intellect matter, then the extensive sampling and courtship that
goes on in the marriage market (here literally construed) starts to
make sense. If the costs of search are roughly constant, then the
returns to search will be highest in markets where the searching
See generally Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for A Complex World 71-90 (Har-
vard 1995).
' Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class
Structure in American Life 110-13 (Free Press 1994). The high parallels of like marrying
like that Herrnstein and Murray report cut sharply against the dominance model of the
radical feminists.
HeinOnline  -- 1999 U. Chi. Legal F.  92 1999
LIBERTY, PATRIARCHY, AND FEMINISM
party faces the highest variance. On this model it is easy to un-
derstand from both the individual and social perspective the time
and emotional effort that men and women put into finding the
right mate.
B. Feminist Ether, or The Nonfalsifiability of Patriarchy
The second point about Becker's position, again like so much
of feminist theory, is that its major conclusions are nonfalsifiable
by any known technique of scientific research. The villain of the
piece is patriarchy, for whose sins this patriarch is charged with
full responsibility. But the modern use of the term patriarchy in
feminist discourse bears only a passing resemblance to its nar-
rower use in traditional discourse. My Funk & Wagnalls diction-
ary defines a patriarch as "[t]he leader of a family or tribe who
rules by paternal right."7 Patriarchy, then, is defined to cover "[a]
system of government in which the father or the male heir of his
choice rules." Even with these definitions under our belt, we are
well advised not to overlook the parallel definitions for women.
Thus a matriarch is defined as "[a] woman holding the position
corresponding to that of a patriarch in her family or tribe."8 Ma-
triarchy for its part is defined as "[a] social organization having
the mother as the head of the family, in which descent, kinship,
and succession are reckoned through the mother, instead of the
father; also government by women."9 It is noteworthy that it does
not speak of "rule by maternal right," so that some social asym-
metry is acknowledged in the parallel definitions.
Standing alone, of course, these definitions give us no indica-
tion of the relative practical importance of matriarchy and patri-
archy. But even with patriarchy as the dominant norm, it re-
mains critical to note the implicit limitations in its classical defi-
nition. First, the term is applied much more to family and to
tribes than it is to nation states, which have leaders, most of
whom have been male. The point matters because it shows the
dangers of treating the state as an extension of the family by
other means. Patriarchs may obtain their power through inheri-
tance, or even by designation of the past leader. But once we
move outside the realm of kings, political power comes through
elections, which give the public control over the selection of can-
7 Funk & Wagnalls New International Dictionary of The English Language 924
(comprehensive ed 1987).
Id at 786.
Id.
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didates, whose actions, once they assume office, are subject to
powerful institutional restraints. To call the President of the
United States a patriarch is to confuse him with the older patri-
archs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (for whom the matriarchs were
Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah).
Second, the creation of any patriarchal order does not confer
that lofty status on all men. Only those men with the power to
rule over others receive that title. Patriarchy therefore contem-
plates that younger males will occupy a subordinate position
within the system. The system also limits the patriarch's freedom
of action to prevent him from becoming a despot. Finding out ex-
actly how a patriarchy operates and how one patriarchy differs
from another is no simple task. But no matter how great the
variations, so long as patriarchal structures are hierarchical, only
a tiny fraction of males can occupy the highest positions. The rest
must be content to rest, perhaps for life, on lower rungs.
In her Article, as in much of feminist literature, Becker does
not use the term patriarch in this literal, dictionary sense of the
word. She did not apply it only to family power that passes by
inheritance. Nor did she limit it to the power that some men ex-
ercise in their governance roles. Rather, in her hands, patriarchy
is used, as best I can tell, as a crude synonym for pervasive and
unjust male domination of all areas of social life. At this point,
her overexaggeration about the pervasive nature of patriarchy
reminds me of the nineteenth century arguments about the inef-
fable status of ether.10
Patriarchy, I suppose, differs in some important ways from
ether. But it is odd to hear complaints about its all-pervasive na-
ture when it is so difficult to observe. Of course, some men behave
abusively toward some women. Of course, male strength makes a
difference in some interactions between men and women. But it is
hardly the case that male dominance has ever generated a static
system in which men take the prime cuts of meat, leaving women
with only the scraps. Indeed, it seems foolhardy to stress the
point because the shift in male and female roles within my own
lifetime has been so profound that it seems almost idle to imagine
some unyielding form of social organization attributable to this
one invisible and invincible source. One obvious measure of the
" As that century wore on, it became ever more clear that Newtonian physics re-
quired some fixed point of reference for its various postulates to work, supplied by an all-
pervasive ether. Yet that ether was not observed anywhere. In the end, the entire struc-
ture collapsed and the modern theory of relativity took its place. For a brief account, see
Gerald Holton, Einstein, History, and Other Passions 177-78 (Woodbury 1995).
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change is visual. Let anyone who cares take a walk down the cor-
ridors of the old Billings Hospital at the University of Chicago
and look at the photographs documenting the composition by sex
and race of its graduates from 1954 to the present. The shift from
a nearly all white male class to the current mixture of male and
female of all races is eyepoppingly clear. The patriarchal forces
that generate this enormous transformation operate in ways that
are too subtle for this observer to understand. It takes a story of
mythic proportions to find in these permanent social changes a
strategic retreat by some old guard which will, cunningly in the
dark of night, reassert its dominance.
Nor need we rely only on this form of pictorial evidence to
make the case. A quick look at the Statistical Abstract of the
United States reveals the profound changes that have taken
place.1 The total number of higher education degrees (those be-
yond high school) has moved up by 365 percent, from 477,000 in
1960 to 2,218,000 in 1995. But what is quite striking is the shift
in the proportions of male and female graduates. In bachelor's
degrees, male degrees have moved up by 107 percent, from
254,000 to 526,000. Yet at the same time, female degrees have
moved up by 359 percent, from 138,000 to about 634,000. Thus in
1960 about 65 percent of the bachelor's degrees were awarded to
men. By 1995, only 45 percent of the degrees were awarded to
men. The shift in professional and doctoral programs has been
every bit as pronounced. As late as 1965, fewer than 5 percent of
all professional degrees were awarded to women, who also re-
ceived just under 12 percent of the doctoral degrees. By 1995,
women received about 41 percent of professional degrees and
nearly 40 percent of the doctoral degrees. 2
The distribution of degrees across subject matter is not con-
stant, but even here the movement has been palpable. From 1971
to 1995, the percentage of women who earned Ph.D.s in the bio-
logical and life sciences moved from 16.3 to 40.1 percent; in
mathematics, the move was from 7.6 to 22.1 percent.3 Indeed, the
percentage of female Ph.D.s dropped in only one field over that
24-year period, parks and recreation. But that number should not
be taken too seriously since only two Ph.D.s were awarded in that
, United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1998
199, Table No 323 (GPO 118th ed 1998) ("Earned Degrees Conferred, by Level and Sex:
1960 to 1995").
12 Id.
3 Id at 201, Table No 326 ("Master's and Doctorate's Degrees Earned, by Field: 1971
to 1995").
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field in 1971, one to a man and one to a woman. 4 The movement
is a stunning refutation of the invisible hand of patriarchy. Per-
haps one could comb these statistics for some hidden evidence of
the continued oppression of women, but any fair-minded observer
should first acknowledge the enormous changes already made
before expressing any reservations about the differences that re-
main. 5
C. Patriarchy's Pessimism
This brings me then to my third source of disagreement. I
recoil from the terrible portrait of all men and all women con-
veyed in Becker's morbid descriptions of patriarchy. It is hard to
know what image to deplore more. Should we be depressed at the
thought of legions of men beating their wives and daughters into
a pulp for the basest of sensual gratification? Or should we recoil
from the thought of millions of wombn who lack the gumption to
stand up to the men who have wrecked their lives through abuse
and sexual domination? It is a portrait of human kind that is so
unrelentingly negative that one wonders why anyone would
bother to bring children into the world. No one can deny that
some horror stories of this sort do exist. Some men, and some
women, have done terrible deeds in their lives: they have killed,
they have lied, they have committed treachery. Lawyers are, of
course; familiar with these cases because bad news attracts a
crowd, whether we speak of a large financial fraud or of a Presi-
dential scandal that ends in impeachment. Yet here again we
have to have some balance. For every case of personal betrayal,
we can find ten, or a hundred, acts of generosity and good will,
from men to women and from women to men. Some marriages
end in acrimonious divorces, but in others husbands and wives
stay together in love through thick and thin until "death do us
part."
To evaluate the overall social position we have to be careful
about how we gather and sample our data. It is, in a word, neces-
sary for us to counter Becker's gloom by a succession of happy
thoughts about the high points of human life. As a professor for
over 30 years, I could act as though all of my students had been
jailed or disbarred. I prefer to think of the many students who
1 4 I d .
" See, for example, Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Compara-
ble Worth, 99 Harv L Rev 1728, 1793 (1986) (noting that the residual earnings gap be-
tween men and women is much smaller than critics commonly acknowledge).
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entered the University of Chicago (or earlier at the University of
Southern California) ill-formed, young, uncertain, and ambitious.
Now ten, fifteen, twenty-five years later, it is a pleasure to see
them lead happy and productive lives, and to hope that their edu-
cation had something to do with their personal and professional
success. It is not that everyone has had carefree lives: many have
had to juggle career and marriage; many have fallen off the rails
more than once; many have had to adjust their expectations to
the brutal realities of everyday life; many have suffered personal
disappointments, deaths of loved-ones, and debilitating injuries.
But even in defeat many have summoned the strength to carry
on. Harsh talk about hierarchy and patriarchy demeans their
personal achievements; it trivializes their personal setbacks and
disappointments. The less said about it the better, and the more
quickly we can get on with the ordinary business of life. Any legal
theory that presupposes that narrow and pinched vision of hu-
man nature, or that substitutes accusations of patriarchy for a
more nuanced look at complex socials systems, must fail with the
falseness of its morbid presuppositions about human behavior,
both within and between the sexes.
II. WHERE WE STAND
Once we have put patriarchy in its place, it is important to
look more closely at our legal rules. No assessment of the issues
that surround feminism can ignore the massive legal revolution
that started in the second half of the 19th century and continued
through the aftermath of the First World War. As with so many
powerful social movements, this one was not confined to the
United States. Rather, for a wide variety of political and social
reasons, virtually every advanced nation accepted, though not
without pain and turmoil, two basic propositions about the place
of women in society. The first involves recognizing the full civil
capacity for women: the right to contract, to hold property, to
make wills, to give testimony, and the like. The second deals with
legally protecting participation in the political process: the right
to vote, to hold elective and appointive office, and the like.
All of these legal changes receive the powerful support of
people with strong libertarian inclinations, like myself. The sim-
ple proposition underlying that theory is the Lockean ideal that
all individuals are free, equal, and independent in a state of na-
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ture.6 Allowing only some individuals to participate in commerce
or politics amounts to a crude restriction on entry that is no more
defensible than similar restrictions on entry into specific lines of
business and commerce. 7 To be sure, competition always brings
with it pain for established competitors who may lose influence or
wealth in the process. But a dynamic assessment of the situation
yields a far different result, for new competitors create opportuni-
ties for the full range of suppliers and customers with whom they
have to do business. As each of us in turn assumes various roles,
we are benefited and harmed in turn by the advent of new per-
sons into any marketplace. But over the long haul, the increased
productivity that follows from the admission of women into com-
merce swamps all other effects before it.
The advent of women into politics and public life obviously
creates a different dynamic because majority rule operates under
very different principles than markets. But at the normative
level, the final conclusion is equally inescapable. No political or-
der can hope to maintain its legitimacy while excluding over one-
half the population from its processes. These points are so incon-
trovertible that it is idle to dispute them today. It is quite impos-
sible to think of any political theory that could repudiate these
commitments. It is therefore inconceivable that any patriarch,
however clever or devious, will be able to undo these profound
changes in the social order, or claim that these are but cosmetic
changes in form with little or anything to do with the operation of
political power. Quite the contrary, the new rules of public life
mark a profound political progression from which we should take
heart. 8 Moving toward the libertarian ideal of full and equal ca-
pacity under law counts as our most enduring legal achievement.
" John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 269-78 (Cambridge Student ed 1988)
(Peter Laslett, ed).
17 On which, see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 37 (Chicago 1944) (dis-
cussing the importance of competition in "bringing about an effective co-ordination of
individual efforts").
"S In 1998, Arizona elected women to all of five of its top statewide offices. See B.
Drummond Ayres, Jr., Arizona Sets Record For a Year of Women, NY Times A18 (Nov 10,
1998). Women are also increasingly represented in state legislatures, where they hold 22.3
percent of all state legislative seats in the United States, up from a mere 4 percent in
1969. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Record for Women in Washington Legislature, NY Times
A18 (Feb 4, 1999). In five states, led by Washington with 40.8 percent, women hold
greater than 32 percent of the legislative seats. Id.
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III. WHAT'S IN A NAME? FROM WOMEN'S LIBERATION
TO FEMINISM
The standard libertarian position proved over time to be a
mixed blessing to the women's movement. In the early days, the
correspondence in objectives between the two systems was close
enough so that it could be asked with some fairness, why should
not every woman be a libertarian in her orientation?
To give but one example, the one nineteenth century decision
that stirs the feminist wrath more than any other is Bradwell v
Illinois," where Justice Bradley's now infamous concurrence ap-
pealed to natural differences between the sexes to justify the re-
striction that Illinois sought to place on the right of women to
practice law. The critical point here is that this decision is inde-
fensible on libertarian grounds even if we gave full force to Brad-
ley's descriptive arguments. If women are less fit for the practice
of law, then we should expect to see them enter the profession in
smaller numbers. The insights of Justice Bradley would then
have predictive power, but they would not justify the imposition
of any entry restrictions on those women who were prepared to
" 83 US 130 (1873). In discharging its power to admit members to the Bar, the Jus-
tices of the Illinois Supreme Court wrote:
That God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and
that it belonged to men to make, apply, and execute the laws, was re-
garded as an almost axiomatic truth.
In view of these facts, we are certainly warranted in saying that when
the legislature gave to this court the power of granting licenses to prac-
tice law, it was with not the slightest expectation that this privilege
would be extended to women.
Id at 132-33 (quoting the Illinois Supreme Court opinion). Justice Miller's majority opin-
ion afirmed the decision below by relying on the Courtfs decision in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 US 36 (1873), which held that the privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment extended only to the rights of individuals as federal citizens and did
not touch on the rights of individuals to enter into certain professions and occupations. Id
at 139. Justice Bradley's concurrence took things a bit further. In one famous passage, he
wrote:
It certainly cannot be affirmed, as an historical fact, that this has ever
been established as one of the fundamental privileges and immunities of
the sex. On the contrary, the civil law, as well as nature herself, has al-
ways recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies
of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and de-
fender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine or-
dinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere
as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of woman-
hood.
83 US at 141 (Bradley concurring).
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negotiate the pitfalls that lay before them. Indeed one oft-
unappreciated strength of the "formal" libertarian position is that
it does not make the right of any individual to enter any profes-
sion contingent on some unstated empirical assumption about the
supposed fitness of any group member to meet the standards of
that profession. Those judgments can be made on an individual
basis within the marketplace once the formal barriers to entry
have been limited.
Cases like Bradwell gave the early women's movement a
huge target at which to shoot. To be sure, civil and political ca-
pacity were not its only objectives, given its evident concern with
protecting women against physical assault and various forms of
economic insecurity.0 These themes, however, quickly rose from
their once-subordinate status once the initial set of legal reforms
was achieved in the public and private sector. It is therefore no
mere coincidence that the name of the women's movement tended
to shift with the re-orientation of its political objectives. For a
while the term "women's liberation" had a certain cach6, and with
it a certain deserved ambiguity. On the one hand it hearkened
back to the older program of civil and political rights, and the
need to liberate women from their second-class status so they
could assume their role as autonomous individuals and political
citizens. But the playful sense of the term carried with it a second
meaning - women could also be liberated from the various social
conventions that structured their lives and constrained their so-
cial and economic choices in ways more subtle than any law could
impose. In the end, the coyness of the expression proved to be its
own undoing, and the broader, more assertive term "feminism"
has fairly swept the board as the umbrella term for the women's
movement.21  &t
A. Freedom of Opportunity, Friction in Outcomes
In matters of sex, as well as matters of race, however, the
shift from formal equality to social equality is far more complex
than a simple change in words. Formal equality can be achieved
by a simple change in legal rules. Once capacity is granted, it can
then be exercised in whatever fashion its holders choose, so long
See, for example, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
171-83, 195-214 (Harvard 1989) (discussing rape and pornography); id at 64-80 (dis-
cussing wages for housework).
2 See generally Nancy F. Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism 283 (Yale 1987)
(arguing that "feminism" in the 1960s and 1970s became "a term of unity, to transcend the
divisions between women's liberation and women's rights").
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as they can gain the cooperation of other individuals to join in
their ventures. A woman may enter into the practice of law but
she, no more than any man, cannot compel others to become her
clients. The net effect of civil capacity, however, is to create a
form of social diversity in individual behavior. The law of con-
tracts allows persons to give up what they value least to obtain
what they value most. In many cases it allows them to make bets
with their futures, to give up one set of expectations and to re-
ceive another in exchange. Sometimes these gambles work out, so
that success, fame, and wealth follow. In other cases, the gambles
fail, and with that failure comes disappointment, mediocrity, and
distress. In all cases, however, unleashing the mechanism of vol-
untary exchange creates a dispersion in the fame and fortune of
the population that operates under its rules. That powerful im-
pulse, however, is very difficult to reconcile with any regime that
demands the equality of results among individuals or groups that
are endowed at some starting point with an equality of formal
rights. One of the central challenges to feminism, and indeed to
any political theory, is to make sense of the observed differences
in outcomes. What does it tell us about the initial conditions un-
der which the various groups labor? What does it tell us about the
process under which their various life choices have been made?
In one sense the disconnect between the equality of opportu-
nity and the equality of results does not give rise to pause. Let us
suppose that there is wide variation in the success and fortune of
individual men and women, but that the distribution in outcomes
within one sex looked about the same as it did for the other,
whether measured by income, occupational choice, health, or life
expectancy. At this point, most feminists would be happy to call it
a day because of their willingness to acknowledge that the proc-
ess is fair when it has generated fair results across men and
women as groups. Life offers no individual any personal guaran-
tees, but so long as expectations at the starting line are the same
for both groups, an unlucky spin of the wheel of fortune counts as
an individual but not a social concern.
The rising concern with identical group outcomes severs the
comfortable link between equality and liberty that lies at the core
of libertarian systems. Each person has the equal liberty to
achieve what he or she can with his or her natural endowments.
No one should prejudge the process and presume that some or-
derly pattern of justice (to use Robert Nozick's phrase) has to
come out of the thousands of small decisions that self-interested
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HeinOnline  -- 1999 U. Chi. Legal F.  101 1999
102 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:
individuals make for themselves.22 But in truth, the separation
between inputs and outputs has never been that tidy even within
a libertarian system. In its idealized version, all moves that indi-
viduals make are through voluntary transactions, using some
prior set of entitlements to labor or physical resources. But the
classical model of libertarianism allows victimized persons to set
aside individual transactions tainted by fraud, incompetence, and
duress. Yet once we make that simple observation - it is not a
concession - we are literally forced to make a second adjust-
ment: now it becomes possible that some forms of duress, fraud,
and incompetence will be undetected in individual transactions,
so that one has to look for some broader proxy that will permit
one to get rid of these distorting transactions. That proxy may not
depend on strict proof of misbehavior in the individual case.
From there it is but a short leap to make this conclusion.
Changing the legal rules did not yield anything like identical dis-
tributions between men and women in critical areas. Even
though there is great movement, it is easy to show that virtually
all the CEOs of Fortune 500 companies are male;2" that occupa-
tional skews by sex are quite powerful so that it is not improper
to identify some occupations (the caring professions of nursing
and counseling, for example) as female and other occupations (the
construction trades, for example) as male.24 Indeed even as we
look at subgroups of certain well-sought-after professions, we find
striking occupational skews in the midst of a more generic equal-
ity: well over 90 percent of neurosurgeons and orthopedic sur-
geons are male; yet nearly a majority of pediatricians are
female.25 These trends are too pronounced to have taken place by
mere chance. The question for the day - for the libertarian at
least - is whether they took place through voluntary sorting or
impermissible influences.
See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 153-64 (Basic Books 1974).
When Hewlett-Packard selected Carleton S. Fiorina as its CEO in July 1999, Fior-
ina became only the third woman CEO of a Fortune 500 company. See Steve Lohr, Setting
Her Own Precedents: Hewlett's Chief Prefers the Path Less Traveled, NY Times C1 (July
23, 1999).
Of registered nurses, women made up 97 percent of the profession in 1975 and 93
percent in 1995. Of elementary school teachers, women made up 85 percent of the profes-
sion in 1975 and 84 percent in 1995. By contrast, of carpenters, women made up 1 percent
of the occupation in 1975 and 1995. Of automobile mechanics, women made up 0 percent
of the occupation in 1975 and 1 percent in 1995. Barbara H. Wootton, Gender Differences
in Occupational Employment, Monthly Labor Review 15, 17 (Apr 1997).
In 1997, men comprised 96 percent of neurosurgeons and 97 percent of orthopedic
surgeons, while women comprised 46 percent of pediatricians. See American Medical
Association, Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the U.S. 20, 28 (AMA 1999).
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B. The Misguided Ambition of Antidiscrimination Laws
It is, of course, possible to put a more aggressive spin on this
issue, and to presume that these observed differences are the
function not of some explicit discrimination but of a whole, loose
aggregate of discriminatory practices that the law should curb if
only it knew how to do so. Here, of course, we can no longer focus
on the forms of de jure discrimination because those were largely
removed in the first burst of reform, so that their residual effects
have little systemic importance. Thus the early civil rights stat-
utes deviated (mistakenly in my view) from the older libertarian
tradition by imposing a duty of nondiscrimination on employers
who operated in competitive markets.26 The basic design error of
the civil rights litigation is that its proponents thought a quali-
fied mandate of forced association - you cannot turn down peo-
ple you do not like for any one of certain forbidden reasons - was
a better protection for individual opportunities than a regime
that maximized the number of separate and independent employ-
ers from whom all individuals, regardless of race or sex, could
obtain work. Unfortunately, this mandate reduces the number of
positions available to potential workers in the first place, by
making it more costly for firms to enter any given line of busi-
ness." The antidiscrimination law undercuts the element of trust
so essential to employment relations by making people do busi-
ness with those with whom they do not want voluntarily to asso-
ciate.' But these objections were brushed aside in the early going
on the view that the antidiscrimination law cleansed hiring deci-
sions of false influences, and thus happily served to increase the
rationality and effectiveness of the overall employment decision.
Yet once that view is taken, then it becomes necessary to de-
cide which deviations from the anticipated rationale patterns are
permissible and which ones are not. Although early civil rights
cases insisted that one show some form of disparate treatment to
make out a civil rights violation,29 that position was quickly un-
dercut by allowing inferences of intention to be drawn from the
" For a defense, see Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Em-
ployment Discrimination Laws (Harvard 1992).
See id at 73.
See id at 75-76.
See, for example, McDonnell Douglas v Green, 411 US 792, 802 (1973) (plaintiff
must make prima facie case that she was a qualified candidate rejected under circum-
stances suggesting discrimination); for later amplification, see Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 256 (1981) (employee bears "ultimate burden of
persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination").
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differences in outcome found in the cases."0 The usual formula,
repeated countless times in civil rights litigation, treats the ini-
tial imbalance between two groups (white/black, male/female) as
a presumptive violation of the law, and then allows the employer
to justify that difference by showing how it all relates to the busi-
ness at hand. 1 But the antidiscrimination laws rest on an abiding
suspicion of an employer's motives, so in the good common law
style of pleading, the employee may then prove that those osten-
sible justifications are mere pretexts for some form of illicit con-
duct.
This tripartite structure quickly invited the use of statistical
argument in disparate treatment cases, for a court must decide
whether any imbalance in the work force took place by chance or
design. 2 Thus by degrees we have a movement from disparate
treatment (the initial theory) to disparate impact (the ultimate
resting place), wherein the matter of intention was submerged
under a theory in which the dispersion of outcomes alone estab-
lished the wrong, wholly apart from the intention that brings it
about.
C. Social Patterning and Disparate Impact
The critical policy question asks whether it is sound to draw
an inference from outcomes to practices - that is, to ask whether
the program of patterned justice makes sense in the area of dif-
ferences in employment and life patterns for men and women,, or
indeed anywhere else. For those who remain committed to the
belief in unobservable system-failure, the answer to that question
' See, for example, New York City Transit Authority v Beazer, 440 US 568, 584
(1979) ("A prima facie violation of the [Civil Rights] Act may be established by statistical
evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect of denying the members of
one race equal access to employment opportunities."); Hazelwood School District v United
States, 433 US 299, 307-08 (1977) ("Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they
alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of dis-
crimination."); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324, 340
n 20 (1977) ("[It is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will
in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composi-
tion of the population.").
Lack of discriminatory intent is not a sufficient defense in disparate impact cases.
See, for example, Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424, 431 (1971) (holding that employer
must show business necessity); Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 425-26 (1975)
(holding that employer must show job-relatedness).
See, for example, McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 804-05 ("[S]tatistics as to [the
employer's] employment policy and practice may be helpful to a determination of whether
[his or her] refusal to rehire [a dismissed employee] in this case conformed to a general
pattern of discrimination against blacks."). A similar logic applies to sex.
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is easy: the imbalances are present wrongs to be rectified, not
outcomes to be explained, let alone celebrated.33
I think that this chain of inferences is mistaken. The connec-
tion between outcomes and inputs is far from apparent. Indeed,
there is no more obvious proposition than this: equal opportuni-
ties will always yield very different results, all quite unequal. In
part the difference is simply a matter of chance. After all, two
sets of 1000 coin-flips are not likely to yield 500 heads each. But
it is a mistake to chalk up to randomness all of the observed dif-
ferences within or across groups. There is good reason to believe
that these differences are in general a function of powerful, sys-
tematic tendencies. Applied to employment and social role differ-
entiation by sex, the conclusion seems clear: a system of equal
opportunities to participate in business and political arrange-
ments will yield differences in occupational choices and political
beliefs. Experience amply confirms the resulting variety.
In many instances the manifest difference in outcomes has
not been taken as a response to systematic differences in prefer-
ences between men and women. Rather, it is treated as a sign
that the system itself did not operate in proper fashion but was
controlled by some hidden flaw. One chief explanation is that "so-
ciety" (often spoken of as some detached, impersonal entity) de-
termines the preferences of all individuals so that the preferences
that are observed in practice are not "authentic" no matter how
deeply held. Rather, they are a product of acculturation and up-
bringing.34 Even if the choices so made do not quite rise to the
level of false consciousness, they nonetheless operate improperly.
This renews the emphasis on the usual suspects for market im-
perfections: asymmetrical information, improper discounting of
future gains, unconscious discrimination, illicit stereotyping, un-
fortunate path dependence, ingrained cognitive biases, and, of
course, glass ceilings - stuff, like the ether, that you could sense
but could not see, let alone measure. So long as one regards dis-
parate outcomes as signs of market imperfections, then the target
for potential reforms is too obvious to dispute.35 The only serious
' See Becker, 1999 U Chi Legal F at 25 (cited in note 1). Feminism does take other
forms. See, for example, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women's Development 168-74 (Harvard 1982) (discussing valuing gender differences).
' Some feminist writers try to explain away gender differences as constructs of per-
vasive, hidden social practices. See, for example, Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of
Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (California 1978) (discussing how
female mothering creates gender differences at infancy).
Catharine A- MacKinnon characterizes this prevalent version of feminism as the
"dominance" approach, which strives to create a gender-neutral reality. Needless to say,
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question is what forms of intervention are appropriate. The mes-
sage is never, but never, be comfortable with the status quo.
IV. DIFFERENT ENDOWMENTS, DIFFERENT BEHAVIORS
I think that this modern trend in feminist argument is deeply
flawed. I now hope to briefly explain the source of the error. Re-
call again the premise of the argument: in a just world, we should
expect to see an equilibrium of parallel distributions between
men and women in all relevant dimensions of employment. But
why should we make that assumption? The issue here is not a
moral question, so it cannot be said that people who deny the po-
sition are misguided in the perceptions of what the world ought to
be. Rather, the issue is a predictive question with a counterfac-
tual component. Knowing what we do about human nature, do we
think that women and men will, in the aggregate, follow similar
career paths in a market system that is not tainted with duress,
fraud, or incompetence? I think that the answer has to be no. To
put the point more strongly, I would be amazed if any voluntary
sorting mechanism, like the one operative in a market economy,
ever produced that identity between any two different population
groups, let alone between men and women.
A. Same Goals, Different Endowments
Let me make the case by starting with an assumption of
what is common between men and women, namely that individu-
als in both groups seek to maximize their utility by finding that
personal and occupational path that best suits their tastes and
other natural endowments. My descriptive assumption is that
individual self-interest (suitably modified to take into account
family and friends) drives and explains the behavior of individu-
als of both sexes. But that common commitment to self-interest,
broadly defined, does not lead them down the same behavioral
paths. Part of the reason is that their initial endowments differ.
Many differences are manifestly physical, but physical charac-
teristics do not operate in a vacuum, so some differences also op-
erate in a psychological sphere.36 The former seems too obvious to
Professor MacKinnon's outlook diverges radically from mine. See MacKinnon, Toward a
Feminist Theory of the State at 215-34 (cited in note 20); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Differ-
ence and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life
and Law 32-45 (Harvard 1987).
' See, for example, Kingsley R. Browne, Sex And Temperament In Modern Society: A
Darwinian View Of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 Ariz L Rev 971, 1006-16
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dispute, and it is the sort of difference that cannot be overcome by
changes in diet or exercise. Brute biology matters too much for
these social responses to neutralize the evident differences. From
this point of departure, I can see no a priori reason for positing
that the psychological make-up of men and women is identical
when physical differences between them are manifest. As for the
latter, a well integrated personality requires that all the pieces fit
together. Let the shape of one piece change, and we should expect
others to change in response to it, even if one piece is physical
and the other mental.
I must provide some methodological qualifications. In making
this statement, I recognize that all men are not identical in these
characteristics any more than all women are identical. In speak-
ing about men and women here, I only mean to say that their
overall distributions differ in predictable ways along many di-
mensions, not that all men, as a class, or all women, as a class,
are identical in all material ways. There are spreads within each
sex, just as there are differences between the two distributions.
Women may have a longer life expectancy than men, but that
does not imply that all women outlive all men.37 Men may be
taller than women, but that does not mean that some women are
not taller than some men.3" So it goes with any trait on which it is
possible to array individuals, both within and across sex groups.
But for the purposes of this discussion, it is the group differences,
not the individual differences within groups, that set the relevant
focal point. It is group differences that explain aggregate differ-
ences. We have, as it were, two bell curves that overlap, but
which are not identical. Their differences count as much as their
similarities.
That said, we should not expect that any set of sex-linked
differences will be confined to a single dimension. Suppose that
men are stronger than women; it would be odd to think that
women would then be more aggressive in their physical interac-
tions than men. Why is it in their interest to pursue actions that
could expose them to greater peril than men? There is no survival
(1995) (arguing for an evolutionary basis for the different psychological characteristics
that women and men seek in potential mates).
7 As of 1996 it was a 6-year advantage (79 versus 73) for females. United States
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1998 94, Table No 128
(GPO 118th ed 1998) ("Expectation of Life at Birth, 1970 to 1996, and Projections, 1995 to
2010").
' About half of males between 20 and 69 are taller than 5'9, as compared to less
than 5 percent of females in that age range. Id at 153, Table No 240 ("Cumulative Percent
Distribution of Population, by Height and Sex: 1988-94").
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value in a mismatch of physical and psychological traits. Rather,
the sensible working hypothesis is that evolution favors the
emergence of personality traits that are organized and developed
as complements in some integrated whole.39 If you know about
the physical differences, then you can posit that the influences of
natural selection will line up those differences with associated
differences in psychological traits. Of course social influences
have their role to play as well. On balance, however, we should
expect socialization to reinforce these basic differences. It is not
in the interest of parents, male or female, to guide their own chil-
dren along the path to self-destruction. We can debate the
strength of any correlation between traits in the physical and the
psychological realms, but it would be foolhardy to expect for all
such correlations to be zero. If differences across different dimen-
sions thus reinforce each other, then we should expect to see
fairly systematic differences in the aggregate data, even if both
groups contain notable outliers.
B. Division of Labor Within the Household, and Without
Next there are key questions about the integration of home
and work life. Here again, I take it as an indisputable difference
that, as a group, women have to (and want to) devote a greater
portion of their resources to childbirth and childrearing than do
men. Pregnancy and nursing have those characteristics, and even
though single women and married couples can substitute tech-
nology for parental care, that strategy will not in the usual case
equalize the level of time in child care given by each parent. The
psychological dispositions should on average match the capacity
to give care, so that women will have a greater desire (or toler-
ance) for this than men.4" Within families, that differential does
not suggest that women do all the childrearing and men none.
But it also suggests that if couples make their trade at the mar-
gin, then women will do more childrearing than men, given their
greater affinity for that activity in some, but not all, cases. The
See, for a lengthier examination, Richard A. Epstein, The Varieties of Self-Interest,
8 Soc Phil & Pol 102, 105-11 (Autumn 1990) (discussing how evolution favors asymmetri-
cal behavior and preferences between the sexes).
See, for example, Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 Feminist Stud 342, 360
(1980) (arguing that the social rather than biological role of mothering, which women
perform predominantly, encourages an ethic of care that is not as pronounced in those who
do not perform this role). Robin West also roots a female ethic of care in women's differ-
ence from men. See West, Caring For Justice 110 (NYU 1997) ("I have no doubt ... that
... [women's] large and small acts of self-sacrifice are emblematic of a distinctive moral
voice.").
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egalitarian marriage will therefore face a systematic obstacle by
demanding equal care from husband and wife. That requirement,
rigidly imposed on a task by task basis, will reduce the total pro-
duction obtainable from marriage, which in turn will reduce both
the frequency of, and gains from, entering into marriage. It is no
surprise that women take more family leave time than men.4' It
is no accident that most people still use the word "house-
husband" with a tinge of bemused disdain.
The effects of differential commitment are not confined to the
division of responsibility in raising young children. It influences
other occupational and educational choices which are complemen-
tary to, and dependent on, family choices. Women commonly take
several years off from work, or reduce their workloads during the
years that their children are young. There is no reason to think
that their husbands have ordered them to do this. To be sure, at
the margin, we can always find conflicts of interest. But in the
round, the more plausible explanation is that the desires and the
functions align, as noted above, so that relative to men, women
have a greater desire to remain at home for extended periods of
time, even at the cost of some occupational and career advance-
ment. That difference in career choices is, in my view, voluntary
in most cases (so much so that part-time work to make ends meet
is regarded by many women as the distraction when the children
are young and at home). Here is one case to follow the revealed
preferences: most women who don't work full-time don't want to
work full-time.42
Once that basic choice is made, it influences the patterns of
investments that women make in the workplace and in training
41 See Commission on Family and Medical Leave, A Workable Balance: Report to
Congress on Family and Medical Leave Policies 92, 271 (US Dept of Labor 1996) (noting
that (a) women represent 58.2 percent of workers taking family and medical leave, while
men only 41.8 percent, and (b) women are nearly twice as likely as men to take leave of
29-84 days), available online at <http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/lib/e-archive/FamilyMedical/
FamilyMedical.pdf> (visited Aug 1, 1999). The number here does not indicate the amount
of income lost owing to unpaid leave.
"2 The Los Angeles Times has reported that "[hlalf of all the women and 20% of the
men [surveyed] said they wished they could work part-time." Daniel Q. Haney, Research-
ers Find Couples Working More Than Ever, and Liking It Less, LA Times C6 (Jan 24,
1999), reporting on the National Study of Families and Households. The point is only
suggestive, not conclusive, because it does not address in so many words the position of
those women who are part-time workers. But the overall sense nonetheless remains clear.
The tradeoff between home and the workplace is different for most women relative to most
men. It is also worth noting that the definition of full-time differs for men and women,
with men putting in, on average, about six hours more per week than women. See Jerry A.
Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson, Who Are The Overworked Americans?, 55 Rev Soc Econ 442,
444(1998).
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for work. There is, for example, now a differential willingness to
take jobs that have high-risk characteristics (especially over the
dimension of time). That in turn leads larger numbers of women
to do jobs on a piecework basis, with fixed income, so that the re-
sidual risk bearers are disproportionately men.43 Over a lifetime
this influences the earnings levels by sex, the nature of the pro-
fessions into which women and men go, and more critically, the
roles that they occupy within those professions. The point here is
that even if all people were the same in every dimension but one,
we should expect to see major differentiation in career paths and
outcomes by simple, repetitive application of the principle of
comparative advantage. As a higher percentage of women gravi-
tate toward flexible hours, more men move into jobs that require
longer hours and extended travel. As men enter occupations that
involve the use of strengh, women incline toward other careers,
including counseling, publishing and administration. If the dif-
ferences work across multiple dimensions (including, as I have
argued elsewhere, the taste for risk)," then we should expect that
occupational choices and career paths between men and women
will continue to diverge as women continue to enter the workforce
in ever greater numbers. Rapid changes in sex roles do not neces-
sarily entail convergence in what people do. The older differences
between women at home and men at work will decline. They will,
however, be replaced by new differences, more subtle to observe,
but important for understanding the newer social order.
Although a bit outdated today, Victor Fuchs' informative
1988 study, Women's Quest for Economic Equality, makes this
basic point. Large numbers of women have entered the profes-
sions in recent years, most notably law and medicine. But the
divergent career paths become most striking when one looks at
the organization of subspecialties.45 There are far more women in
family law than in contingent fee tort litigation; there are far
more in pediatrics or obstetrics and gynecology than there are in
See Epstein, 8 Soc Phil & Pol at 112-13 (cited in note 39) (discussing how biologi-
cal determinants of human behavior can produce different preferences for risk between
the sexes).
" See Richard A. Epstein, Gender is for Nouns, 41 DePaul L Rev 981 (1992); Richard
A. Epstein, Some Reflections on the Gender Gap in Employment, 82 Geo L J 75 (1993);
Epstein, 8 Soc Phil & Pol 102 (cited in note 39).
Victor R. Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality 32-57 (Harvard 1988)
(noting also that the gaps in self-employed income is as great as in employee income, and
that differences between the sexes in tips and commissions track the differences in
wages). Discrimination by employers cannot alone explain these strong correlations.
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neurosurgery or orthopedic surgery." Some portion of this differ-
ential could be explained by discrimination within the field, but
the variations are so pronounced that it is hard to believe that all
the pressures come on the side of the employers, and none on the
side of the employees. In that world it is hard to posit discrimina-
tion as the source of all occupation differences, as if by some irre-
ducible law of nature. Even the admitted differences in employer
response on the demand side should not be attributed solely to
improper behavior. The selection effect works on the other side as
well. Women in effect choose their career paths to maximize a
function that attaches weights to work and family which differ
systematically from those attached by men. There is on this view
no iron social law that designates certain positions as male and
others as female. But there are differential pressures at work at
every stage of life in the choice of profession, and the roles within
that profession.
V. PRIVATE AND COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES: OR, THE TYRANNY
OF SMALL DECISIONS
How long should we expect this current division of labor to
persist? It is hard to say how matters will sort themselves out.
But no matter how trends develop, it would be a serious mistake
to assume that all social pressures cut in the same direction. At
one level, it is possible to discern a social prisoner's dilemma
game that operates on labor markets. My own casual empiricism
says that it is quite common for women to champion, and for men
to agree, that greater female participation in certain high-status
professions and disciplines counts as an unquestioned social good.
At the social choice level, we can find substantial political support
for government programs that push in this direction, hence the
carrot of affirmative action programs (many of which go beyond
what the law requires) and the stick of antidiscrimination laws
(under which judges are too eager to find discrimination when
" For women in the legal profession, see Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Profes-
sional Women, 40 Stan L Rev 1163, 1179 (1988) ("[F]emale attorneys in the mid-1980s...
were disproportionately represented in low-prestige specialties."), citing Bill Winter, Sur-
vey: Women Lawyers Work Harder, Are Paid Less, but They're Happy, 69 ABA J 1384,
1385 (1983); Wynn R. Huang, Gender Differences in the Earnings of Lawyers, 30 Colum J
L & Soc Probs 267, 280 (1997) (illustrating survey results that "a higher percentage of
women than men was found in family law and public interest law, while a disproportion-
ately higher number of men than women was found in corporate law and litigation"). In
1997, there were 25,633 women physicians in pediatrics and 12,542 in obstetrics and
gynecology, while there were 217 in neurosurgery and 756 in orthopedic surgery. Physi-
cian Characteristics at 28 (cited in note 25).
ill
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none exists). Once again the current labor scheme does not look
like patriarchy in action.
But matters shake out quite differently at the individual
level. The same woman who thinks that there should be more
female partners at the major investment banking houses might
make a personal decision not to put in the endless hours needed
to reach that goal. More than her male counterpart, she may
want to stay at home with her children or she may just hate trav-
eling. She may dislike the grind and the constant bullying in
high-level negotiations. She may well resist any suggestion that
stereotypes are at work in this regard. Hers is just an individual
judgment about herself; self-consciously, it is not one about the
position or capabilities of women in general - an issue on which
she takes the opposite view.
This careful psychological calibration, however, hardly mat-
ters for these purposes. The operative question in all these dis-
crete settings is how often that same intellectual and emotional
process leads to the same results. If most women go through the
same thought process only to reach the same conclusion, then the
process we see at work may be termed the tyranny of small deci-
sions. The landscape of family and occupational choices reflects
not just the big picture views on sex-equality, but also the com-
posite small picture views of what is right for me and my family.
The exact proportions of the two influences are hard to discern,
but in any particular case, the immediate family imperatives are
likely to exert in each individual case a disproportionate impact
on the final decision.
This simple scenario allows us to sketch out a public choice-
like explanation for the disconnect between political attitudes
and personal behavior. It is an explanation that does not require
us to assume the irrationality, instability, or endogeneity of pref-
erences. In political settings, the personal is put to one side; peo-
ple will vote their general preferences, and will happily support
laws that presume that any imbalances in labor markets are
really a function of social forces of discrimination. So the politics
of a nation moves to the left, more for women than for men.47 But
47 See John R. Lott, Jr. and Larry Kenny, How Dramatically Did Women's Suffrage
Change the Size and Scope of Government 1, 29-36 (Sept 1998) (unpublished manuscript,
presented as John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No 60 2d Series, Univ of
Chicago Law School), available online at <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Publications/
Working/index.html> (visited Aug. 1, 1999) (noting the liberal shift in national politics
resulting from women's suffrage and the persisting "gender gap" in voting for Presidential
elections).
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at the individual level, the accumulated set of practices turns out
to be more conservative than the public rhetoric because a set of
individual rational choices leads to outcomes that reinforce the
occupational and wage splits that are globally deplored. The long-
term equilibrium is thus in tension. The sum of the private selec-
tion decisions will be treated as powerful evidence of discrimina-
tion that requires strong government antidotes, but these ground-
level practices will prove largely resistant to grander changes.
Most legal intervention is directed against employers. The key
determinant is not firm selection, as is generally supposed, but
worker selection that to this day remains largely outside the in-
fluence of the law. Who wants a statute, for example, that says
(and means): "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
any employee to fail or refuse to work, or to quit, or to otherwise
discriminate against any employer because of his race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin"?
Yet this speculation leaves unanswered the hard question as
to why the politics of women veer systematically to the left of
men, and why the trend is becoming more pronounced.48 The first
cut at this problem suggests that the opposite should be the case.
As women receive as much or more formal education than men,
as women enter the workforce in larger numbers, we should ex-
pect their experiences to converge with those of men. With the
convergence of experience comes, one supposes, the convergence
of political views. But the opposite has happened. When women
enter the workforce, their experiences are often not the same as
men. They think more about childcare on the home front. They
are more concerned with travel and with long hours. They are
more interested in part-time positions. They obviously have dif-
ferent concerns with sexual harassment. And they bring to the
workplace a set of styles and attitudes that do not mesh perfectly
with what they perceive as the dominant male culture.
With time, differences in orientation will surely lead to
changes in workplace culture. In the short run they will also find
expression in the voting booth, leading to legislation that influ-
ences the behavior in employment markets. The issues become
" Women and men have diverged in party identification, with women leaning to the
left and men to the right. See Steven Stark, Gap Politics: More Women Have Moved to the
Democratic Party and More Men Have Gone Over to the Republicans, Atlantic Monthly 71
(July 1996). According to a 1996 Gallup Poll on partisan identification, 29 percent of the
women surveyed identified with the Republican Party and 40 percent identified with the
Democratic Party, as compared to 33 percent and 32 percent of men surveyed for the par-
ties, respectively. Harold W. Stanley, Vital Statistics on American Politics: 1997-1998 111,
Table 3-2 (Cong Quarterly 6th ed 1998).
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ever more clouded because the influx of women into the workforce
often is at odds with itself. The demands of high-paid professional
women do not dovetail ideally with the demands of women who
hold "pink-collar" jobs. The apparent unity of women in the end
will turn out to be no greater than the apparent unity among
men. With the rise of these cross-currents come ever more com-
plex patterns within firms and within politics.
CONCLUSION
Here is not the place to analyze the output from so complex a
process. But it is appropriate to close with the cautionary note
that blunt instruments will not do in either the world of descrip-
tion or prescription. On the descriptive side, I think that we have
to be candid as to what the differences between men and women
are, and to recognize that their effects are not cabined into some
tiny area of human life, but influence all our experiences and in-
teractions. On the normative side, I think that we have to fight
against the common view that equality of opportunity, if rightly
conceived, necessarily and properly brings about equality of re-
sults. More specifically, we should not try to tinker with market
outcomes by insisting on proportional representation across the
ranks.
The pattern that we see is not one that is driven by exploita-
tion (which, like the ether of classical mechanics, becomes ever
more difficult to detect). Rather it is driven by informed choices at
the micro level. The greatest protection for all workers is a broad
range of choices made possible by free and open entry into labor
markets. Of course, we have to be alert in individual cases to the
risks of duress, misrepresentation, and incapacity that can skew
contractual preferences in untoward ways. But these small per-
turbations, of immense complexity in litigation, do not aid in un-
derstanding broader social trends in society, for they operate only
in a small fraction of cases, and then in ways that are orthogonal
to the concerns about male/female differences in education, in-
come, occupation, and career path. Once we adopt the proper so-
cial stance, then we can forget about patriarchy and say with con-
fidence that outcome differences are a source of social strength
and a sign of a free society.
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